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Book Review

Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism? (2016)
Populism has not always borne a pejorative connotation. But those days
are long gone with political figures like Jörg Haider, Geert Wilders, Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan, Viktor Orbán, and Donald Trump starting to dominate the
public sphere. Nowadays, the talk of populism, “one of the main political
buzzwords of the 21st century” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, p. 1), as a
problematic (even evil) political stance has almost become omnipresent.
From conventional media outlets to every flavor of social media, one
cannot stand a fair chance of not being exposed to the “notorious” concept
at least a couple of times a day.
William Gibson recently tweeted that “populism, a nightmare state
of democracy, can result in electing someone very foolish, or perhaps
criminal, or even, perhaps, both.” And for those who are unfamiliar with
the name, Gibson is not a political scientist or a sociologist. He is not even
a political commentator, but a well-established American-Canadian
speculative fiction writer best known as the author of the cult science
fiction novel Neuromancer, and the inspiration behind the Matrix films.
Nevertheless, his uncomplicated and smart definition should be
underlined: populism as “a nightmare state of democracy.” For although a
nightmare belongs to the subconscious, it is still an offspring of the mind.
So is populism’s relation to representative politics. There is no populism
outside of the realm of representative systems. As Jan-Werner Müller
(2016a, loc. 98) puts it, “the danger comes from within the democratic
world.” Populism is an “internal periphery of democratic politics;” populism
as politics is performed on the “edge of liberalism” (Arditi 2005, 2006).
It is almost obvious that Gibson was basically referring to the rise of
Trump. Populism, however, has not entered common parlance overnight.
Sociopolitical developments witnessed in continental Europe during the
last three decades have already proved that populism had been on the
rise. In one of the recent issues, the headline that the English edition of Le
Monde diplomatique decided on, to announce Perry Anderson’s (2017)
analysis on the cover, says a lot: We are living in the age of “the populist
revolutions.” This state of affairs revived the academia’s interest in the
phenomenon once again. Not only popular, but also academic
publications on the subject have increased significantly especially since
the early 2000s.
2017 marks the fiftieth year of the famous conference on populism
at the London School of Economics that convened to shed light on and
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develop a definition of the much-contested concept. Although that
conference produced a comprehensive edition (Ionescu and Gellner
1969), which is regarded as “the definite collection on populism” (Taggart
2000), no single one theory came out of that attempt. Let alone a theory,
Ghița Ionescu and Ernst Gellner (1969) did not even come to a shared
decision about a definition of populism.
An overview of the literature on populism can easily prove that
there was no common consent on the meaning populism in the 1960s.
Attempts at developing a theory (e.g., Laclau 1977) remained incomplete
in the 1970s. In this way, it has become “a cliché to start writing on
populism by lamenting the lack of clarity about the concept and casting
doubts about its usefulness for political analysis” (Panizza 2005, p. 1). For
a very long time, everyone has been talking about populism but the
definitions varied remarkably, and almost all contributions started with a
concession that no one knows what populism exactly is.
In his recent book, What is Populism?, Jan-Werner Müller does not
substantially constitute an exception in regard to the lack of theory. Müller
(2016a, loc. 38) reinforces the widely held view by mentioning “we simply
do not have anything like a theory of populism” although he – as a scholar
and a Professor of Politics at Princeton University – has contributed to the
search for a theory. He states in the Acknowledgements of the book that
one of his previous publications, which the book draws on, bears the title
“Towards a Political Theory of Populism” (Müller 2016a, loc. 1858).
Instead, in this short book, Müller (20016a, loc. 49) claims to provide the
reader with tools to “recognize and deal with populism.” Would recognizing
the symptoms of a political disposition really help without a theory of the
“malady” in the current age?
Before responding to this question, a point of progress should be
noted. In contrast to the earlier mentioned confusion regarding the
meaning of populism, the concept is not very much contested anymore.
Recently, some experienced scholars in the study of populism – such as
Paul Taggart (2000; 2002), Yves Mény and Yves Surel (2000), Cas
Mudde (2004), Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) –
provide very similar definitions and seem to agree on the core of populism.
To give a gist, populism is
an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into
two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’
versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be
an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.
Populism, so defined, has two opposites: elitism and pluralism.
Mudde (2004, p. 543)
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Accordingly, Francisco Panizza (2005, p. 1) is nearly right in his
claim that although “there is no scholarly agreement on the meaning of
populism, it is possible to identify an analytical core around which there is
a significant degree of academic consensus.” This “theoretically elegant”
core, which “provides the basis for rich empirical analysis,” is presented
with three elements: “a mode of identification, a process of naming and a
dimension of politics”. Thus, populism can be understood along the lines
of these three questions: “Who are the people? Who speaks for the
people? How does populist identification occur?” Müller’s work falls within
this analytical core.
As a rule of thumb, simplistic conceptualizations that attribute a
derogatory lineament to populism should be abandoned completely for a
clear analysis. There is more to populism than simply being opportunistic
attempts of political leaders to win votes by embracing stances that are
deemed politically incorrect. Müller escapes this trap successfully. He
“rejects the paternalistic liberal attitude that effectively prescribes therapy
for citizens ‘whose fears and anger have to be taken seriously’” (Müller
2016a, loc. 80), and argues against populism being “connected, primarily
by liberal commentators, with irresponsible policies or various forms of
political pandering” (Müller 2016a, loc. 167).
The current intellectual state of “reached agreement” shows us that
two characteristics are central to populism: the populist leader’s
association with the people and a reference to the other, often the elite,
against which the people are positioned. Populism as an ideology
conceives of society as separated into two antagonistic groups: “the
people” and “the other.” Pure origins of democracy are grounded in the
general will of the people. And accordingly, the people should reign
supreme since they are the cultural and socioeconomic foundation of
democracies. This appeal to the people is problematic, however, since
there is an inherent ambiguity in the nature and function of the concept of
“people” in Western politics.
The concept of the people itself bears a polar meaning. The Slavic
word “narod,” which stands both for “the people” and “the nation” aside,
the concept of people in modern European languages names the
constitutive political subject as well as the class that is excluded from
politics. It always also indicates the underdog — the poor, the
underprivileged, and the excluded. The Italian, French and Spanish words
for “the people” all derive from the late Latin term populus, and they
designate – both in common parlance and in the political lexicon – the
whole of citizenry as a unitary body politic as well as those who belong to
inferior classes. The English term, in a similar way, retains the meaning of
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ordinary people as opposed to the rich and the aristocracy. Thus, there
seems to be a dialectical oscillation between two opposite poles: on the
one hand, there are the people as a whole and as an integral body politic;
and on the other, the people as a subset and as fragmentary multiplicity of
needy and excluded bodies.
What populism really aspires is not to bridge over that divide, but
rather to define a subset of the whole population as the owner of the
general will. In any instance of populism, the people are an “imagined
community.” They come on the scene as a mythical and constructed
subset of the whole population.
The author of this book is quite aware of this ambiguity. “The idea
of the single, homogeneous, authentic people is a fantasy,” writes Müller
(2016a, loc. 57). Populists, however, behave as if there is an essential
homogeneity, and the populist claim is based on the idea that only the
populists can represent the people (Müller 2016a, loc. 49, loc. 1372).
“They and they alone speak in the name of what they tend to call the ‘real
people’ or the ‘silent majority’” (Müller 2016c, p. 10, see also Müller 2017).
After the publication of his book, Müller (2017) warned against
Trump’s use of the term “the people” in the Inaugural Address. “January
20th, 2017, will be remembered as the day the people became the rulers
of this nation again,” (The White House 2017) declared Trump in his
speech. Müller (2016c, p. 10) also refers to Nigel Farage, the leader of the
UK Independence Party. In his speech, after the EU referendum, Farage
had claimed the result of the referendum “as a victory for the real people”,
suggesting that 48 percent of the voters who voted against Brexit do not
count as real people. According to Müller, this is the shared language of
Trump, Farage, Orbán, Erdoğan, and the likes. Each and every populist
employs the same mode of identification. The populist leader associates
himself with the people, and thus claims that only his true self represents
the people. A more striking example from the book comes from Turkey:
Think, for instance, of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
declaring at a party congress in defiance of his numerous domestic
critics, “We are the people. Who are you?” Of course, he knew that
his opponents were Turks, too. The claim to exclusive
representation is not an empirical one; it is always distinctly moral
(Müller 2016a, loc. 49, see also Müller 2016b).
Populists, argues Müller, are necessarily anti-elitist. But being
critical of elites does not suffice to be a populist. In accordance with
Mudde (2004), Müller states that populists are always antipluralist as well.
When in opposition, they see their political rivals as immoral elites. When
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in power, they do not recognize any legitimate opposition. They are the
people, “righteous and morally pure.” Anyone who does not support them
is illegitimate, and does not belong to “the people.” The implication is that
they are the “100 percent.” So, populism is an exclusionary form of identity
politics that tends to threaten the very notion of democracy (Müller 2016a,
loc. 50-60). It is not surprising that considerable segments of the society
under populist regimes that do not identify with the populist leader feel
threatened, and that their existence is denied – such as in the case of
Alevis in Turkey (see Kingsley 2017).
Müller (2016a, loc. 70) points to three specific features of populist
governance: (1) They attempt to hijack the state apparatus. Fifteen years
of the AKP rule, especially the political trials, and the great purge that has
taken place in Turkey after 2007 might have provided a very good
example for the author. (2) Corruption and “mass clientalism.” And finally,
(3) They are always engaged in efforts to systematically suppress the civil
society. Once again, ample proof, which has increased exponentially
under the state of emergency that was declared by the AKP in July 2016,
can be found in Turkey. Müller’s book, of course, is not an empirical study
– and thus does not go into the specifics of USA, UK, Turkey or Hungary.
What differentiates populists from any authoritarian regime in terms
of the above-mentioned features is the populists’ justification of their
conduct. Since they claim that they alone represent the people, “they
avow their practices quite openly.” They claim to represent the common
good as willed by the people (Müller 2016a, loc. 1381). Müller thinks this is
also an explanation “why revelations of corruption rarely seem to hurt
populist leaders” as in the case of Erdoğan’s Turkey and Haider’s Austria.
Turan Subaşat’s (2017) article in this issue of MGDR provides a detailed
outline of the political economy of the populist regime in Turkey.
The most promising part of Müller’s book might have been the final
chapter (Müller 2016a, loc. 1043-1362) where the title suggests that he
would discuss the ways to deal with populists. The chapter, however, is
mainly dedicated to criticizing common responses to populism. Still, finally
he proposes that to engage with populists, their political claims should be
taken seriously without “taking them at face value” (Müller 2016a, loc.
1157). Populists should be criticized for being a real danger to democracy,
asserts Müller. But “that does not necessarily mean that one should not
engage them in political debate. One can take the problems they raise
seriously without accepting the ways in which they frame these problems”
(Müller 2016a, loc. 1390).
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For MGDR, with its emphasis on globalization and development,
while the dominant approaches of its readers and contributors – focused
as they are on markets and consumption – are economic and cultural, in
the present era politics has moved to a central space in all popular and
intellectual discussions. The book reviewed here provides sharp political
insights into forces that are not only shaping markets in many individual
major nations – USA, UK, Turkey, Russia and India, for example – but
also reshaping global economic, political, and cultural connections among
nations.
To respond to the question in the beginning of this review, yes,
even without a theory of populism, Müller’s book helps. It is timely and –
although steeped in political theory – it is accessible to a general
readership. Originally published in German, it is a welcome contribution to
the vast academic literature on populism. With almost simultaneous or
immediate editions in English (2016), French (2016), Italian (2017), and a
forthcoming edition in Turkish (2017), it could also be expected to prove to
be a popular addition as well.
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